An inspectorate of the Department for Work and Pensions.

Report

Charter Mark - Awarded for excellence

Security

2.1 It is important that councils have effective measures and processes to prevent and deter fraud from entering the system and to detect fraud. Councils should verify information supplied by customers and ensure that conflicts identified through data matching are reconciled. Sufficient resources must also be employed to investigate suspected fraud thoroughly and professionally, and appropriate sanctions should be applied.

2.2 Based on the reported performance for April 2005 to September 2005, Weymouth and Portland Borough Council met or were on target to achieve Standard in 2 of the 3 performance measures for which a standard is set, and met 13 of the 21 enablers for Security.

Security of administration

2.3 This section reports on the arrangements for interventions and the verification of claims. The performance measures are designed to measure the impact of the council’s performance in detecting fraud and error.

Performance measures

2.4 Figure 2.1 shows the council’s reported performance during the first
2 quarters of 2005/06.

Fig. 2.1: Performance measures - Security of administration
Performance measures Description Standard Performance April to September 2005 Standard met?
PM 10 Number of interventions where review action commenced in the last quarter 800 1201 Yes
PM 11 % of data matches resolved within 2 months 100 87.5 No
PM 12 Number of claimants visited 1000 660 on target

Source: Weymouth and Portland Borough Council

2.5 The council did not meet Standard for PM11. We were told that a number of factors had contributed to this, including delays in taking initial action on referrals and customers not providing appropriate documentation to support reported changes of circumstances.

2.6 We confirmed at the end of September 2005 that the council was on course to meet its 2005/06 target of 1000 visits.

2.7 The council operated an effective system to monitor the number of interventions achieved against its annual target. This included a separate Interventions team that:

2.8 Between August and October 2005, the council had implemented contingency arrangements to increase interventions made by post following the retirement of 2 staff in July 2005. We were told that 2 Visiting Officers were recruited in October 2005.

Performance enablers

Compliance with the Verification Framework or to equivalent standard

2.9 Weymouth and Portland Borough Council met both enablers.

2.10 The council told us it had complied with the Verification Framework since 1998 when it volunteered to be a pilot site. It had procedures in place to ensure that where evidence was required to support a claim or change of circumstances, customers provided this evidence in its original form.

2.11 Benefits Assistants examined all new claims and reported changes of circumstances received, by post or at reception, prior to the work being passed to the Benefits Assessors. This was to check that the evidence supplied by the customer was sufficient to support the claim or change and that it met Verification Framework requirements. We were told that Benefits Assistants completed this work to a high standard and that Benefits Assessors provided prompt feedback where evidence that was required had not been requested.

2.12 Contact Centre staff operated the council’s reception service where customers could make a claim and hand in documents and evidence to support claims or changes of circumstances.

2.13 Depending on staff resources being available and the volume of customers visiting reception, Contact Centre staff would check that evidence met Verification Framework requirements. This provided a good customer service, however, further improvements could be made if the council revised its processes by:

2.14 Contact Centre staff and the Benefits Administration team had access to ultraviolet scanners and we were told staff used them to authenticate original documents.

2.15 Our random sample of 20 new claims and 10 changes of circumstances showed a good standard of verification with appropriate documents and evidence being collected and recorded to satisfy the evidence requirements of the Verification Framework.

2.16 XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX X XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XX.

2.17 Training had been provided for all appropriate staff. Discussions with processing, interventions and Contact Centre staff confirmed that training had been received and that there was a good level of knowledge of the evidence needed to comply with the Verification Framework.

2.18 The HB and CTB training provided for processing staff included a section on the Verification Framework which incorporated the:

2.19 Verification Framework refresher training had been provided for all appropriate staff in July 2005 and fraud awareness training had been provided for Contact Centre staff in September 2005.

2.20 In addition, the cases selected for the quarterly accuracy check used to provide Best Value Performance Indicator data were examined to ensure that they fully met the evidence requirements of the Verification Framework.

Compliance with data integrity

2.21 Weymouth and Portland Borough Council met the enabler.

2.22 The Housing Benefit Matching Service confirmed that the council had complied with its requests for HB data, in accordance with its agreed schedule. For the 12-month period ending September 2005, the Department confirmed that no major incidents had been reported regarding the data quality and that the target to match 98% of National Insurance numbers had been exceeded.

Counter-fraud activities

2.23 This section reports on the council’s efforts to detect and deal with fraud.

2.24 The council joined the Dorset Anti-Fraud Partnership in April 2005 to improve its counter-fraud performance. The main aims of the partnership were to:

2.25 A service level agreement had been signed that placed certain obligations on all parties to ensure that agreed standards and targets were being met. These were reviewed and monitored every 3 months by senior managers from each of the 4 councils.

Performance measures

2.26 Figure 2.2 shows the council’s reported performance from 2004/05 to the second quarter of 2005/06 for its Counter-fraud activities.

Fig. 2.2 Weymouth and Portland Borough Council's performance measures - Counter-fraud activities
Performance measures Description Performance 2004/05 Quarter 1 2005/06 Quarter 2 2005/06
PM 13 Number of fraud referrals per 1,000 caseload 33.62 22.33 8.57
PM 14 Number of fraud investigators employed per 1,000 caseload 0.76 0.48 0.48
PM 15 Number of fraud investigations per 1,000 caseload 31.07 19.91 6

Source: Weymouth and Portland Borough Council

2.27 We were told that the reduction in the number of fraud referrals and cases investigated was due to new procedures being introduced when the council joined the Dorset Anti-Fraud Partnership. New guidance ensured that all fraud referrals passed through the Senior Benefit Assessors, before being sifted and risk scored. We describe this process later in the report.

Performance enablers

Fraud referrals

2.28 Weymouth and Portland Borough Council met one of the 2 enablers (E21).

Fraud awareness

2.29 Fraud awareness sessions were provided to Contact Centre staff in September 2005. The sessions provided staff with important information and explained the:

2.30 New arrangements for referring cases of suspected fraud were introduced when the council joined the Dorset Anti-Fraud Partnership. The Partnership provided the council with a central team to manage referrals from all 4 councils. It also provided comprehensive written guidance and examples of the types of cases to refer. These encouraged staff to:

…consider whether all non-intrusive methods to resolve the issue have been addressed to the best of your ability...

2.31 The council had introduced an additional check by nominating the Senior Benefits Assessors to sift all referrals. This involved evaluating the information and evidence provided in referrals against the criteria set in the procedural guidance. While this added value, it was also important that Benefits Assessors and Assistants were regularly reminded about how to identify and report cases of suspected fraud. Refresher training is essential to maintain awareness and encourage good quality referrals.

2.32 We were told that the council intended to carry out refresher training for processing staff but sessions had not yet been scheduled.
(Medium Priority Recommendation 9)

2.33 New recruits to the Benefits service received fraud awareness as part of their induction training. However, this was not extended to all council staff.

2.34 The council planned to introduce an on-line fraud awareness package which would be available to all council departments but no date for implementation had been agreed. In addition, the Dorset Anti-Fraud Partnership issued quarterly Fraud Awareness Bulletins to Benefits staff that included information about legislative changes and counter-fraud activity.

2.35 A standard referral form was available to all Benefits staff. This was introduced during October 2005. Following the scoring of the fraud referrals, results from all referrals were fed back to the Senior Assessors for action.
For example:

2.36 However, Benefits Assessors told us that prior to the introduction of
the new referral form, they were not routinely provided with feedback on referrals they had made. We could not find any examples in our sample of
28 investigation files where it was recorded that feedback had been provided.

Fraud hotline

2.37 The council subscribed to the Department’s National Benefit Fraud Hotline to enable members of the public to report cases of suspected fraud. The telephone number was publicised widely in council publications, on its website, in reception areas and in other public buildings. However, analysis of its fraud referrals showed that no referrals had ever been received from this source.

2.38 In addition, the council provided a local telephone hotline number, publicised in its annual Council Tax Guide and its Benefit claim form. The
24-hour hotline was answered during the day by Investigation Officers and by an automated answering service at night. The council acknowledged that it needed to review the effectiveness of its telephone hotline service.

Risk profiling referrals

2.39 Weymouth and Portland Borough Councilmet neither of the 2 enablers.

Gathering intelligence

2.40 In order to measure any improvements in counter-fraud performance since the council joined the Dorset Anti-Fraud Partnership, we agreed to sample a proportion of cases investigated before and after April 2005.

2.41 We looked at 5 (18%) cases that were investigated before the council joined the Dorset Anti-Fraud Partnership in April 2005. These files were of poor quality and contained no evidence of the use of intelligence sources.

2.42 We examined 23 (82%) cases investigated after April 2005 and confirmed that Investigation Officers had made significant progress with regard to investigation techniques. However, we still found evidence that background checks were not being carried out or considered in all appropriate cases. These could have assisted the Investigation Officers to collect supporting information before deciding to visit or interview a suspect. For example:

2.43 We examined records that showed the council used the Department’s Operational Intelligence Unit to obtain information from the Inland Revenue where appropriate. During 2005/06, council records showed it made 11 requests for information from the Inland Revenue and reported minimal delays in receiving responses from the Operational Intelligence Unit. We were told that response times ranged between 5 and 10 days.

2.44 The council subscribed to the National Anti-Fraud Network in August 2005, but our sample showed that it was not making full use of its services to make enquiries under the Social Security Fraud Act 2001. We found 2 (7%) of the 28 investigation files examined where it would have been appropriate to contact the National Anti-Fraud Network but the council had not done this.

2.45 With the exception of referrals passed to the council by the Department’s Counter Fraud Investigation Service, all referrals were evaluated and sifted by the Dorset Anti-Fraud partnership using a standard scoring system. The council should have regard to the priorities and objectives of the Dorset Anti-Fraud Partnership and consider scoring all fraud referrals, including those referred by the Counter Fraud Investigation Service, thereby ensuring consistency in its selection methods. (Low Priority Recommendation 14)

2.46 Depending on the score attained the referral was assigned as low, medium or high priority. Low risk cases were not investigated by the Benefit Fraud team but passed to the Interventions team to consider if further action was appropriate, for example, a visit.

Management information

2.47 The council did not adequately monitor the quality of referrals to ensure the risk based sifting process could be applied effectively to all cases. We considered the quality of referrals could be improved by the collection and analysis of management information to provide feedback to referrers and encourage better quality referral information. Records should be kept to show:

2.48 The Dorset Anti-Fraud Partnership monitored the number of cases where a sanction had been applied and recorded the type of fraud against each case. For example, ‘undeclared earnings’ or ‘living together’. The risk-assessment process was reviewed annually by allocating the highest score to those fraud types that had resulted in the most successful outcomes.

2.49 Details of investigations were recorded on the fraud module of the Benefits IT system. However, we found that the system did not hold sufficient information to assist the analysis and targeting of counter-fraud activity. In particular it was not capable of recording and reporting the end-to-end process of an investigation in terms of:

2.50 Staff from the Dorset Anti-Fraud Partnership were responsible for centrally monitoring the progress and activity on investigation files for all 4 councils. It is important that members of the partnership review the adequacy of their current case management systems, and establish whether a central database would better meet its aims to provide a coherent and efficient service.

Action on referrals

2.51 Weymouth and Portland Borough Council met neither of the 2 enablers.

2.52 We sampled 28 investigations that were closed between September 2004 and October 2005. Of these, one (4%) had been referred through the National Fraud Initiative. In 2 (7%), we could not establish the date of the referral or the date of the first investigative action. Against the Performance Standards target of 10 days, the remaining 25 (89%) cases had taken between 2 and 81 days before the first action was taken with an average of 21 days.

2.53 Figure 2.3 shows performance in this area.

Fig. 2.3 Days taken to start investigative action after the referral had been received
Number of days Number of investigations %
1 – 10 8 32
11 – 20 9 36
20 and over 8 32
Total 25 100

Source: BFI analysis

2.54 Figure 2.3 shows that in 32% of cases the council was taking over
20 days to start an investigation. Failure to promptly investigate cases following receipt of the referral meant that the customer was still being paid benefit and there was potential for any subsequent overpayment to increase accordingly. The council needs to introduce a process to track referrals to prevent unnecessary delays from occurring. (High Priority Recommendation 3)

2.55 We reported earlier that the fraud module of the Benefits IT system was limited in the amount of information it captured. For example, we were unable to analyse the council’s performance in sifting referrals because the system did not provide a field to record the date of sift. This was compounded by inaccurate recording of data by staff. We were told this was due to unfamiliarity with the procedures and practices of the Dorset Anti-Fraud Partnership.

National Fraud Initiative

2.56 Our sample included one case referred to the council through the National Fraud Initiative. The council failed to promptly allocate the case for investigation, which resulted in an unacceptable delay of 202 days to action the referral. A formal caution was applied in this case, however, the council’s failure to act promptly had contributed to the amount of the overpayment. If the caution had been refused by the customer, any subsequent prosecution action by the council may have been prejudiced by this unacceptable delay.

Housing Benefit Matching Service referrals

2.57 Data-match referrals from the Housing Benefit Matching Service provide a valuable service to identify fraudulent claims and potential overpayments of benefit. We were concerned to find that very few referrals were being passed to the Benefit Fraud team for investigation. For example, during October 2005 only 2 (8%) out of 24 referrals were raised as fraud investigations.

2.58 There was a risk that actions may have been taken by the Interventions team which might have prejudiced the outcome of fraud investigations. We consider it good practice and suggest that staff from the Benefit Fraud team undertake an initial evaluation of the data-matches to ensure that potential fraud cases are immediately identified and actioned.
(High Priority Recommendation 4)

Fraud investigators’ code of conduct

2.59 Weymouth and Portland Borough Council met 3 of the 4 enablers
(E26, E28 and E29).

Compliance with legislation

2.60 We examined the files of 5 investigations undertaken before the council joined the Dorset Anti-Fraud partnership. The council acknowledged that the investigations were of a poor quality but stated that they were dealt with in accordance with its policy at that time.

2.61 These files were raised and recorded on the Benefits IT system as investigations and each had an Investigation Report. In the absence of any strategy and policy documents setting out the criteria for investigating cases suspected of fraud at that time, we would have expected the council to have carried out these investigations in accordance with the appropriate legislation. However, these files did not comply with the requirements of the Criminal Procedures and Investigations Act 1996.

2.62 We also examined the files of 23 investigations undertaken after the council joined the Dorset Anti-Fraud Partnership. We noted improvements in the construction and maintenance of the files. For example, we found that files were constructed in a consistent format using standard documents that were clearly labelled.

2.63 However, the council used a combination of the fraud module of the Benefits IT system and paper files to record information. Our sample showed that documents and information were not always chronologically filed, making it difficult to follow the progress of some investigations. Investigation files were stored securely when not required by Investigation Officers.

2.64 When the council joined the Dorset Anti-Fraud Partnership it adopted a number of its policies that covered:

2.65 A Code of Conduct for Investigation Officers had been introduced in
April 2005 that set out:

2.66 Policies and procedural guidance were supplemented by:

2.67 In conducting an investigation, the Investigation Officer should pursue
all reasonable lines of inquiry, whether these point towards or away from the customer. What is reasonable in each case will depend on the particular circumstances. (High Priority Recommendation 1)

2.68 To comply with the Codes of Practice of the Criminal Procedures and Investigations Act 1996, all relevant material relating to an investigation should be recorded in a durable or retrievable form and retained on file. We would expect to find the following information recorded:

2.69 We reported earlier that files investigated before the council joined the Dorset Anti-Fraud Partnership failed to meet the legislative requirements for recording all investigative activity, and it was difficult to establish whether all lines of enquiry had been pursued.

2.70 However, from our sample of 23 files investigated after the council joined the Partnership, we found:

2.71 In response to our findings the council told us that it had applied its policy criteria shown in its Code of Conduct. This stated that:

Officers are required to act reasonably and proportionate when making enquiries or seeking information from individuals and organisations…

2.72 However, in the absence of any record made by the Investigation Officers or comment following a review of the file during the quality control check, we considered that these actions were overlooked at the time.

2.73 All Investigation Officers completed official notebooks to record their daily activities. We examined the notebooks and established that regular entries had been made.

2.74 The issue of official notebooks was controlled and recorded by the
Dorset Anti-Fraud Partnership using a central register.

2.75 Management checks were not carried out. We consider it good practice to undertake a minimum monthly check to ensure that the content and layout of notebooks meet legislative requirements.

Management checks

2.76 Weymouth and Portland Borough Council needed to introduce management checks at key stages of investigations in order to monitor its progress and outcomes. We were told that a review of each Investigation Officer’s caseload was carried out on a monthly basis. However, it was evident from our sample that delays were occurring at the outset of investigations and we would have expected these to have been identified and recorded as part of this check, which they were not. (High Priority Recommendation 5)

2.77 We were shown evidence that Weymouth and Portland Borough Council had introduced formal management checks in October 2005 to track progress and monitor any delays.

2.78 The Dorset Anti-Fraud Partnership operated a formal quality control process which was supported by a policy and procedural guidance.
Although the council joined the Partnership in April 2005, this formal process was not introduced operationally for the council’s Investigation Officers until September 2005.

2.79 The Dorset Anti-Fraud Partnership provided a Sanctions Officer who had responsibility for checking every closed investigation file and recommending whether the file was suitable for a sanction or should be closed with no further action.

2.80 A Case Management Officer, also provided by the Partnership, had responsibility for carrying out an additional check using a Quality Control Matrix that recorded:

2.81 There was some duplication in the checks carried out by both officers, specifically where the checks involved looking at the evidential and legislative aspects of an investigation. We suggest that the council reviews its procedures to avoid duplication of work and to provide feedback where appropriate.

Use of surveillance

2.82 The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and the Home Office Statutory Code of Practice covering covert surveillance was introduced into legislation in 2001. It provides instructions on how and when surveillance can be legitimately used by criminal investigators within the public sector.

2.83 The Dorset Anti-Fraud Partnership had developed a policy and procedural guidance for authorising requests for surveillance. We were told the Office of the Surveillance Commissioners had reviewed this following an inspection during June 2005 and made only minor recommendations.

2.84 Failure to carry out surveillance in some cases may compromise the effectiveness of investigations. The council’s Investigation Officers had not carried out any previous surveillance activity at the time of our on-site visit.

2.85 We considered that surveillance may have been appropriate in 3 (11%)
of our sampled cases but there was no evidence that this had been considered. This may have helped Investigation Officers obtain relevant information and importantly, would have provided assurance that all possible lines of enquiry had been pursued, as required, under the Criminal Procedures and Investigation Act 1996. (High Priority Recommendation 1)

Interviewing customers

2.86 Our sample of 28 investigation files include 4 (14%) where an interview under caution had been carried out. All cases showed that Investigation Officers had followed the Code of Practice for questioning suspects and tape recording interviews in accordance with the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.

2.87 XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX X XXXX XXXX XXXX X.

2.88 XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX X XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX X.

2.89 XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XX.

2.90 XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XX

2.91 XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XX.

The local authority fraud policy

2.92 Weymouth and Portland Borough Council met 4 of the 5 enablers.
(E30, E31, E32 and E33)

2.93 Members had approved its revised Anti-Fraud Strategy and Sanctions Policy on 11 October 2005. The document set out the aims and objectives for the Benefits Investigation team and stated:

2.94 In order to meet this aim the council implemented a number of actions, including the:

2.95 The Dorset Anti-Fraud Partnership had developed a Counter Fraud Business Plan for 2005/06. The plan included actions to support the integration of the council into the partnership and stated a commitment to review:

2.96 The plan did not identify the resources required to meet these objectives. We recommend the council regularly reviews the performance of the Benefit Fraud team to ensure that the Dorset Anti-Fraud Partnership meets its commitments to share resources and experience equitably between all member councils. (High Priority Recommendation 6)

2.97 XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX X.

2.98 Section 182A of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 allows councils to require providers of postal services to return to the sender social security post that would otherwise be redirected. This can help to identify possible fraudulent HB and CTB claims.

2.99 The council was operating the Royal Mail’s ‘Do not redirect’ scheme correctly. XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX X.

2.100 Details of post returned through the ‘Do not redirect’ service, were recorded on its Benefits IT system and routine checks were conducted to establish whether:

Authorised individuals

2.101 A check with the Department’s central records showed that all Investigation Officers had been correctly registered with the Department’s Programme Protection Division.

2.102 Records showed that the council’s Investigation Officers had completed the relevant training. This enabled them to lawfully request and obtain information from individuals and organisations regarding suspected benefit fraud offences.

2.103 From our sample of 28 investigation files, we found that authorised individual powers had been used in 2 (7%) cases. These were used to obtain wages information from employers and information from the Department’s Operational Intelligence Unit.

2.104 All files showed that quality checks had been carried out but the checks did not cover the use of authorised individual powers.

2.105 While records of requests were maintained on individual case notes and a copy stored in a separate file, the council had no assurance that central records were kept to show how, when and why these powers had been used for all cases. (Medium Priority Recommendation 10)

Fraud Partnership Agreement

2.106 The Fraud Partnership Agreement for 2005/06 was agreed through the Joint Operational Board and had been tailored to meet local needs. Monitoring of the Agreement was achieved through quarterly liaison meetings between the Dorset Anti-Fraud Partnership and the Department’s Counter Fraud Investigation Service, and at the Joint Operational Board.

2.107 In addition, joint working arrangements were discussed at the Dorset Investigators’ meeting held every 6 months, where it had been formally agreed that invitations for joint investigations would only be acted upon where a joint interview under caution was appropriate.

2.108 Delays in receiving overpayment decisions from the Department’s Debt Management service had been reported to Jobcentre Plus. This issue had been discussed at liaison meetings and delays in individual cases were being monitored to establish timescales for the return of decisions.

2.109 We were told that 12 cases were awaiting a decision and the Dorset
Anti-Fraud Partnership had taken action to fax a list of outstanding cases, requesting the Department to provide a progress report on each case.

Sanctions

2.110 This section reports on the arrangements for applying sanctions against benefit fraudsters.

Performance measures

2.111 Before the council joined the Dorset Anti-Fraud Partnership in April 2005, its performance in applying sanctions was poor.

2.112 Figure 2.4 shows the council’s reported performance for 2005/06.

Fig. 2.4: Performance measures - sanctions
Performance measure Description Performance 2005/06
PM 16 Number of successful sanctions per 1000 caseload 1.2
Number of successful prosecutions Nil
Number of prosecutions laid before the court that were not successful Nil
Number of administrative penalties agreed 1
Number of cautions accepted 3
Number of cases that were referred to the sanctions panel or equivalent with a recommendation to sanction those that were rejected Nil

Source: Weymouth and Portland Borough Council and the Department

2.113 Between June and September 2005 the council had applied 4 sanctions. We were told that a further 5 cases were being considered for action. Before June 2005 the council had failed to apply any sanctions, despite investigating cases where a sanction may have been appropriate. We report on this later under Fraudulent overpayments.

Performance enablers

A balanced sanctions policy

2.114 Weymouth and Portland Borough Council met 2 of the 3 enablers.
(E36 and E37)

2.115 We reported earlier that Members had approved its Sanctions Policy.
In its business plan, the Dorset Anti-Fraud Partnership had decided not to set individual or team targets for applying sanctions. However, it did state that it would:

...issue or apply sanction action and or commence criminal prosecution proceedings in all appropriate cases identified for such action in accordance with the law and our policy guidance.

2.116 While its policy guidance was mainly consistent with the Department’s, some flexibility had been included, for example before making a decision about the appropriate sanction it would consider the:

2.117 The Sanctions policy also stated that the final decision on whether to prosecute the customer was the responsibility of the Revenues and Benefits Manager.

2.118 The policy set out the process for applying sanctions in appropriate cases. We examined the process and confirmed that the Sanctions Officer checked each case and ensured that checks of the customer’s history had
been made, to find out if there had been any previous convictions. Our sample of files contained 4 cases where a sanction had been applied. We examined all 4 cases and found evidence of checks made against the:

2.119 In all cases the appropriate notifications to the Department for recording the outcome of investigations were issued.

2.120 We sampled 3 cases where a caution had been offered and accepted. We listened to the taped recordings and examined transcripts of the interviews, and considered that in each case the council had not satisfied the Department’s guidance to obtain a clear and reliable admission from the suspect that they had knowingly committed an offence with the intent to obtain benefit.
(High Priority Recommendation 7)

2.121 The council had procedures in place to ensure that if a caution or administrative penalty was refused, the cases would be referred for prosecution.

2.122 We consider the deterrent effect of publicity to be one of the most valuable outcomes of a prosecution. We commend the Dorset Anti-Fraud Partnership for publicising its successful prosecutions in the local press.

Fraudulent overpayments

2.123 To consider the council’s performance in applying sanctions, we requested details of all overpayment cases raised between September 2004 and October 2005 that the council had classified as fraudulent.

2.124 During this period the council classified 113 overpayments as fraudulent. While we did not examine all 113 cases, we considered it reasonable to assume that sanctions may have been appropriate in some of these cases.

2.125 We examined in detail the 10 overpayments cases with the highest value. We found 6 (60%) out of the 10 cases where it may have been appropriate to apply a sanction.

2.126 The council had not taken full and appropriate investigative action in any of the 6 cases. For example, it failed to:

2.127 As a result alleged benefit offences may have been allowed to go unpunished.

2.128 The council had also missed the opportunity to generate income through the Department’s subsidy reward scheme.
(High Priority Recommendation 8)

2.129 We noted that all 6 cases were actioned before the council joined the Dorset Anti-Fraud Partnership.

[Previous] [Next]