An inspectorate of the Department for Work and Pensions.

Report

Charter Mark - Awarded for excellence

Findings (continued)

Keeping it right

Definition

2.139 Keeping it right means ensuring payments of benefit are adjusted as claimants' circumstances change through the period of a claim for benefit. The government’s expectation is that LAs will build on the work done to secure the gateway to HB and CTB by ensuring that there are effective safeguards to keep payments right, for as long as they continue to be paid.

2.140 Claimants’ circumstances can change frequently, and it is their responsibility to tell DWP or the LA about changes that might affect their benefit. However, benefit rules can be complex and it may not always be obvious to claimants what they must report and to whom. Research has shown that more than 70% of mistakes enter the system after the initial valid claim has been determined.

2.141 There are 3 crucial areas :

Findings

Renewal claims speed of processing

2.143 The HB Regulations make no distinction between new and renewal claims with the result that regulation 76(3), quoted in Getting it right, applies equally to renewal claims.



2.144 The general section in the benefits unit deals with renewal claims. This section is made up of 3 teams with 7 processing staff in each.

Autoreview

2.145 LB Haringey has an 'autoreview' process. The post opening officers identify any IS and JSA cases for autoreview and send them to the dedicated autoreview officer. They are not scanned in to the workflow system at this point. All other renewal claims are scanned straight away from post opening.

2.146 The auto reviewer sifts the forms into 3 groups:

2.147 The first 2 groups account for about 80% of cases. The autoreviewer returns the complex cases to the scanning team for scanning, and processes the others. The autoreviewer processes cases before checking verification of NINOs, identity, IS entitlement and so on. The autoreviewer then returns the cases for scanning.

Fig. 2.15: Number of days between receipt in office and scanning

Period in days

Number of incidences
0-5

23
6-10

5
Over 10

16

Source: BFI sample

2.148 Figure 2.15 shows that most cases are scanned within 5 working days of receipt. However, many take more than 10 working days. These are usually autoreview cases which are treated as less urgent because they are already processed. On average, renewal claims are scanned in 13 days. This figure does not represent processing times because a large number of autoreview cases are processed before they are scanned into the workflow system. This may cause problems if a change of circumstances is reported in the intervening period, as the caseworker will not have access to the most recent information on the renewal form.

Fig. 2.16: Renewal claims processed within 14 days of receipt of all information

Case type

Volume

%
RR

25

88
RA

14

93

Source: BFI sample

2.149 We excluded 5 cases from the sample as they were determined under autoreview and were processed before being scanned. This made it difficult to tell when LB Haringey had actually received all the information required.

2.150 The average time to process a renewal claim from receipt of all information to determination is 5 days.

2.151 All claims were processed within required timescales and we found no evidence of any cases being paid past the renewal date. Indeed, the benefit system is configured to prevent payment run-ons from occurring.

We recommend that LB Haringey abandons the autoreview process and ensures documents are scanned on time.

Renewal claim verification

2.152 To assess LB Haringey’s performance in verifying renewal claims, we sampled a total of 44 claims processed between July and September 2000. Figure 2.17 provides a breakdown of this sample, and Figure 2.18 gives a profile of the cases.

Fig. 2.17: Breakdown of renewal claims sample

Claim type

Volume

%
RA

16

36
RR

28

64
Total

44

100

Source: BFI sample

Fig. 2.18: Renewal claims sample profile

Attribute

Volume

%
With partners

11

25
With dependants

26

59
With non dependants

10

23
Male claimants

22

50
Female claimants

22

50

Source: BFI sample

2.153 Figure 2.19 shows verification standards in the sample.
Fig. 2.19: Evidence obtained and verified

Attribute

Volume

Verified

%
Claimant NINO

44

36

82
Partner NINO

11

7

64
XXXX XXX

XX

XX

XX
XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX

XX

XX

XX
XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXX

XX

XX

XX
XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXX

XX

XX

XX
XXXX XXXX

XX

XX

XX
XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX X

XX

XX

XX
XXXX XXXX XXXX

XX

XX

XX
XXXX XXXX XXXX XXX

XX

XX

XX
XXXX XX

XX

XX

XX
XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX X

XX

XX

XX

Source: BFI sample

2.154 This analysis shows that verification standards for renewal claims are not as stringent as for new claims. This is surprising because, as we noted under Getting it right, we were impressed by the knowledge and commitment of staff in this area.

2.155 XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XX
XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX X
XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXX

2.156 Our sampling also gave us the chance to assess individual elements of LB Haringey’s performance.

NINOs

2.157 In the sample, only 82% of claimants' NINOs had been verified, and only 64% of partners' NINOs. Legislation at the time allowed for the requirement to be deferred on the first renewal, but this has now lapsed. This indicates the work LB Haringey must do to comply fully in the future.

Rent liability

2.158 In 37% of the cases sampled, there was no current evidence of liability. We accepted tenancy agreements produced within a year of the renewal claim as current, but we disregarded agreements older than this where there was no evidence that they continued in force. The standard of performance is clearly not acceptable.

XXXX XXXX XX

2.159 XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXX
XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XX
XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX
XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXX
XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX

IS and JSA(IB)

2.160 Receipt of IS or JSA(IB) provides a straightforward gateway into 100% HB and CTB entitlement. In these circumstances an LA is obliged by law to assume that the claimant has no income or capital, substantially reducing what needs to be verified. It is essential that LB Haringey verifies that the qualifying benefit is in payment. Research has shown that the majority of fraud and error occurs after a relevant change of circumstance which the claimant has not reported.

2.161We are concerned that LB Haringey uses an automatic review form to deal with renewal claims in receipt of IS/JSA. A partly completed form is automatically issued to the claimant 6 weeks before the benefit expiry date, asking if any change has occurred since the last claim. This is bad practice as it encourages claimants to sign the claim form as "no change" rather than to state positively the current state of circumstances. XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXX
XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX X

2.162 XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XX
XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XX

Other income

2.163 We are pleased to note that in all the cases where the non-dependants had declared income, LB Haringey had made efforts to verify amounts.

2.164 XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXX
XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX X

2.165 XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXX
XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXX
XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XX
XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX X
XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX X
XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXX
XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX X
XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX
XXXX XXXX XXXX

2.166 This confirms the need for some fraud awareness training for all benefits staff, and also the need to ensure agency staff receive similar training before being allowed to process benefits. The issues of awareness and awareness training are considered later in this section as part of Fraud awareness and referrals.

2.167 The lack of knowledge in this area has serious implications for the accuracy of the benefit caseload. XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XX
XXXX XXXX XXXX XXX Many of these may not have been assessed accurately, and some may have been overpaid for a long time.

Capital

2.168 We found evidence of capital being verified in 2 of the 5 renewal claims where capital was declared. However, the remaining 3 were all in receipt of IS/JSA, so there was no need to verify capital.

Claim form completion

2.169 In our sample, 86% of renewal claim forms were complete, but a number of these were autoreview forms that contained much of the existing claim information before being sent to the claimant. While on site we were shown a draft of a replacement renewal claim form, which uses optical character recognition technology. This is intended to improve the quality of evidence gathered while retaining some of the advantages of the autoreview process.

We recommend that LB Haringey:

Aligning benefit award periods

2.170 Regulation 66(2) of the HB Regulations and 57(2) of the CTB Regulations provide that:

The benefit period shall be such number of benefit weeks as the appropriate authority shall determine having regard in particular to any relevant circumstances which the appropriate authority reasonably expects may effect entitlement in the future.

2.171 The caseworkers and senior caseworkers we interviewed indicated that they were aware of the regulations and said that action was taken to align benefit periods. Our sample suggests that this is not the case.

2.172 We identified 5 cases (11.6%) in our new claim sample where a change in circumstances could be identified at the time of the initial determination. The benefit period had not been tailored to allow for these changes. Three cases involved a current award of WFTC. Another was awaiting the outcome of a claim for WFTC. In the fifth case the claimant was receiving contribution-based JSA.

2.173 Similarly, our sample of renewal claims contained 6 cases where the benefit period should have been realigned, 4 with occupational pensions, and 2 with relevant age changes.

2.174 The total debt identified in our sample of 58 overpayment cases was £58,989. Of this, £1,301 was attributed to not aligning benefit periods. Viewed in the context of an outstanding overpayment debt of £15 million, as much as £345,000 may have been prevented by full compliance with the regulations

We recommend that LB Haringey:

2.175 LB Haringey does not pursue the reason for a claimant’s failure to return a benefit renewal claim form. These cases are simply allowed to terminate on the end date of the benefit period. Failure to return a claim form may indicate a desire to cease claiming. LB Haringey should try to find why this is, and the correct entitlement end date. Any overpayment may be recoverable.

We recommend that LB Haringey pursues the non-return of renewal claim forms to find out why the claim has not been renewed, and to determine the correct date of termination of benefit entitlement.

Risk categories

2.176 VF sets out requirements for verifying claimants’ circumstances by a series of visits and postal checks. To ensure the best use of resources the checks have been designed to target effort into 5 risk groups. Although not yet compliant, processing staff do categorise claims into risk groups. In Figure 2.20 we compare LB Haringey’s risk group classification with the VF’s.

Fig. 2.20: Analysis of benefit risk groups

Group type

Number categorised by LB Haringey

Appropriate category under VF
A

2

1
B

Nil

N/A
C

14

11
D

18

10
E

9

8
Total

43

30

Source: BFI analysis

2.177 We found that 13 claims had been put in incorrect risk groups. Seven had been put in a lower risk group than was appropriate and 6 had been put in a higher group than they should have been.

2.178 An error rate of over 30% in the categorisation of risk is poor performance. It will need to be significantly improved if LB Haringey is to:

We recommend that:

Review and further review

2.179 Anybody dissatisfied with a determination that affects them can ask for the determination to be reviewed. An officer of the LA carries out this review. If the person is still not satisfied, they can ask for a further review of the determination by a review board of at least 2 local councillors.

2.180 A request for review must be received within 6 weeks of the determination. The LA must respond to the request within 14 days.

2.181 Where the person affected asks for a further review, the request must be received within 28 days of the date of the decision on the first review. Regulation 82 of the HB Regulations prescribes that a review board should be held within 6 weeks of receiving a written request, or as soon as reasonably practicable.

2.182 Reviews and further reviews are dealt with by the general processing sections. There is no dedicated resource to deal with reviews. By monitoring workloads using the workflow system, senior caseworkers will decide what resources are available for reviews at any given time. Periodically the benefit management team will also look at the workflow system and decide the priority of reviews and appeals.

2.183 There is no set management report that allows managers or senior caseworkers to monitor intake, output or outstanding work in this area. There is no monitoring of the performance against the set stages in the review process.

2.184 If a claimant asks for a further review the case is checked by a senior caseworker and another senior caseworker checks this for completeness. The case is then passed for a review board. The officer in charge of setting up review boards carries out a further examination of the case for accuracy.

2.185 This is a clear misunderstanding of the system. It indicates that LB Haringey does not properly consider claimants' requests for review unless they ask for a further review. Figures 2.21 and 2.22 show this process can result in considerable delays.

Fig. 2.21: Reviews and further reviews

Case

Claimant notified of determination

Internal review requested

Review carried out

Request for further review received
1

22/9/99

2/12/99

4/1/00

19/1/00
2

14/10/99

17/12/99

5/1/00

19/1/00
3

14/2/00

30/3/00

15/6/00

5/9/00
4

23/11/99

21/7/00

11/8/00

4/10/00
5

5/10/00

12/11/00

21/1/00

5/7/00

Source: BFI sample

Fig. 2.22: Days between appeal stages

Case

From determination to review request

From review request to decision

From review decision to further review request

Total time
1

53

24

12

99
2

48

14

11

73
3

35

56

59

150
4

175

16

39

230
5

29

53

117

199

Source: BFI analysis

2.186 None of these cases has yet been heard by a review board.

2.187 The specialist team is responsible for setting up review boards and preparing cases for presentation. It told us that a review board usually sits once a month although it may be cancelled. Each review board will hear 3 cases, and they are always held in the evening.

2.188 At 22 November 2000, LB Haringey had 52 cases awaiting a review board hearing, the earliest dating from September 1999. At 3 a month it would take almost 18 months for them all to be heard. This is clearly unacceptable, a breach of regulations and a poor public service.

2.189 The specialist team uses a spreadsheet to monitor review board cases. We examined this, and found that in the 6 months from April to September 2000 only 9 further reviews had been heard by a review board. The results were:

2.190 In one of the cases the outcome had not been recorded, although the decision and the reasons for the decision should be sent to the claimant and will be needed if challenged by judicial review. We were told that the review board is reluctant to sit without a full quota of 6 members, and that if only 5 are available the claimant is encouraged to postpone to a later date. This bad practice has resulted in a large number of postponements.

2.191 LB Haringey is considering running review boards during the day and reducing the number of members required to 3. It is hoped this will reduce the outstanding work.

We recommend that LB Haringey urgently allocates additional resources for appeal work. This will allow the existing backlog to be dealt with as soon as possible, and provide a more realistic staff complement to maintain this important element of benefit delivery, especially in the light of the new appeal procedures effective from July 2001.

We recommend that LB Haringey establishes a management reporting system to provide control and oversight of requests for reviews. This system should cover all activities associated with reviews, including the time taken to arrange and conduct review board hearings. This will provide management with greater assurance on the efficiency of review requests and help to identify weaknesses and delays as they arise.

2.192 We also advise LB Haringey to implement the proposed change to the timing and constitution of review boards to enable outstanding work to be cleared.

Payment methods and cheque dispatch

2.193 A secure system of payment production and dispatch is essential to prevent internal fraud and incorrect payments. It is good practice for an authority to utilise a mixed economy of payment methods, to be able to satisfy the requirements of all claimants and to provide for the appropriate levels of security.

Cheque dispatch

2.194 Cheques are not produced by LB Haringey staff. There is a direct interface between First benefits and ICL in Enfield where the cheques are produced. Cheques are returned to Alexandra House to be sent out by non benefit staff.

Cheque reconciliation

2.195 Mail opening staff cancel all returned cheques by writing "cancelled" and scoring through the cheque. At the end of post opening the supervisor checks and signs for the valuables. The supervisor then passes cheques, cash, postal orders and returned cheques to the valuables clerk who records and signs for them and stores them in a locked drawer.

2.196 Returned cheques are logged in the register, stamped "cancelled" in red and posted with a copy of the log through internal mail to cheque control in Alexandra House. Cheque control signs and returns the log which is then filed with the original.

2.197 Cheques, cash and postal orders are logged in the register, taken by hand to the cashier in Alexandra House and signed for on handover.

Bank Automated Clearing System

2.198 The payment file is run overnight on the First software system and sits on the server before being transferred. The IT section cannot transfer the file without a specific security code supplied by managers from the benefit unit.

2.199 The security codes are pre-programmed into a calculator-type machine. Access to this machine is restricted to 2 members of the management team and it is stored in a locked filing cabinet in one manager’s room. When the manager inputs their unique password they access the pre-programmed 5-digit security code. This code is then input onto the payment system by the IT section to allow the transfer of the file. On successful completion of the transfer another security code appears on the payment system which will correspond to the new number on the manager’s machine.

2.200 There are a number of security features to ensure the integrity of the system:

IT security

2.201 Administering benefits is highly dependent on the use of IT and the security and integrity of the whole system depends to a large extent on the security of the software. EA has recently carried out an IT audit, although the results were not available at the time of our on-site visit. Our specific comments are in Appendix C. Generally we found few problems, but we remind LB Haringey to ensure that users access and permission levels are kept up to date.

Fraud awareness and referrals

Fraud awareness

2.202 Staff told us that the relationship with the fraud team was good. Referrals are made using a standard referral form held on the DIP system and feedback is provided in all cases. However, none of the staff we spoke to had received fraud awareness training.

2.203 While we were on site, we ran an awareness testing session. The results are detailed in Appendix D. They suggest that knowledge of fraud indicators varies between individuals and is patchy, with all the participants lacking awareness in some areas.

2.204 LB Haringey is fortunate to have a benefit team with an average of 6 years’ experience in benefits. Part of that experience includes identifying potential fraud and referring suspicions to the investigators. However, few benefit staff are in a position to see developing trends as fraudsters find new ways to exploit the benefit system. A rolling programme of fraud awareness training is necessary to ensure benefit staff are up-to-date and able to identify potential fraud.

2.205 Regular fraud awareness training helps to improve the quality of fraud referrals. Although fraud awareness presentations have not featured in LB Haringey for at least 5 years, we were pleased to be told that a programme of fraud awareness presentations will be delivered during May 2001.

We recommend that LB Haringey agrees and implements a rolling programme of fraud awareness training. Experienced investigators aware of local fraud trends should be involved in delivering these sessions. The programme should be co-ordinated as part of an overall training plan linked to the Benefits Service Business Plan.

Referrals

2.206 There is a standard form for referring cases to BIS, and benefit staff are familiar with the referral process. The benefits sections are the main source of fraud referrals, but the quality of many referrals is considered to be poor.

2.207 Investigators provide written feedback to referrers in every fraud case investigated. This feedback also doubles as a report to the benefits section when BIS recommends altering or suspending a claim.

2.208 Management should be able to identify the source of referrals to measure success. This analysis can then be used to help design future counter fraud activity and identify training needs.LB Haringey was unable to provide the source of referrals received, although it does keep records of referrals made by staff from the benefits section.

2.209 From our sample of closed fraud cases, we found that 18% had been closed with no investigative action taken, as it was deemed in most of these cases that a fraud referral was not applicable. Benefit section staff had referred all of these returned cases.

2.210 To test this issue further, we asked for details of fraud cases closed between April and September 2000. Figure 2.23 shows the results.

Fig. 2.23: Fraud cases closed between 1/4/00 and 30/9/00
Number of cases closed

503
Number of cases closed without investigation

93
Percentage of cases closed without investigation

18

Source: BIS report

2.211 It is clear that some of the fraud casework is self generated in the form of proactive residency check visits. Our interviews with staff confirmed this. However, the bulk of fraud investigations result from benefit staff referrals, so it is important to ensure that such referrals are appropriate.

2.212 LB Haringey staff complete a fraud referral form for every suspected fraud. This contains information about:

2.213 Unless suspect claims are blatantly fraudulent, they are put into payment and referred to BIS for investigation. We were concerned at this, as it is evidence of inadequate verification.

2.214 Fraud referrals received from benefits are immediately logged onto the fraud database. The fraud supervisor checks and assesses the risk associated with the referral. The decision to investigate or not is notified to the referrer. Referrals are then allocated to individual investigators.

2.215 BIS receives referrals from benefit processors, visiting officers, internal parking control officers, housing management, the Housing Benefit Matching Service (HBMS), the London team against fraud, BFIS and from data matching internally and with the National Fraud Initiative (NFI) and other organisations. Although receives referrals from the Do Not Redirect scheme, it told us that results achieved from this source were poor. We were surprised by this, given the good results from data matching with the PO database.

We recommend that LB Haringey reviews its results from the Do Not Redirect scheme to analyse the causes of the disappointing results.

2.216 We are satisfied that LB Haringey's procedures ensure good supervisory control of prioritisation and allocation of fraud cases.

2.217 Between April and September 2000, BIS completed 475 fraud investigations. These yielded 93 WBS claims, giving a low success rate of 20%.

2.218 The success rate achieved during the first 2 quarters of 2000/01 contrasts sharply with 1999/2000. In this full year 480 WBS claims were made against 905 closed cases: a success rate of 53%.

We recommend that LB Haringey establishes an accurate picture of the potential fraud risk by type. It can then develop an operational framework and a set of priorities to help target its counter fraud effort more effectively.

Fraud hotline

2.219 LB Haringey subscribes to Fraudwatch, a facility provided by a private company which charges an annual fee of approximately £1,500. IA receives referrals from Fraudwatch covering the full range of the LA’s business, not just benefit fraud.

2.220 IA refers allegations of benefit fraud to BIS, using the standard referral form. BIS could not provide details of referrals received and successes achieved. However, we were told that there were few referrals from IA.

We recommend that BIS carries out a full evaluation of the Fraudwatch scheme, including:

2.221 Depending on the results of this exercise LB Haringey may wish to evaluate alternatives such as a dedicated benefit fraud hotline controlled by BIS.

HAs and landlords

2.222 HB payments to landlords have a high fraud risk. Consequently, the processes involved in paying HB to landlords should be structured in such a way as to reduce this risk. Although LB Haringey arranges and participates in HA landlord forums, there is no automatic input from BIS staff. The specialist team has 3 liaison officers responsible for liaising with HAs.

2.223 There are 1,949 landlords and letting agents receiving direct HB payments. These landlords can be identified through the system and actively monitored. We are concerned, however, that other landlords who do not receive HB direct can only be identified by individual system query.

2.224 LB Haringey needs to use its links with landlords to emphasise the counter fraud effort. Although determination notices notify landlords of their responsibility to report changes, LB Haringey should use every opportunity to remind landlords of their responsibilities.

2.225 Landlord forums provide the chance for benefits staff to explain complex aspects of HB legislation, including methods of recovering overpayments, and for BIS to provide appropriate updates on fraud operations, including successful initiatives, planned proactive work and sanctions applied as a result of investigative activity. However, given the number of private sector landlords such forums are unlikely to be effective in reaching many of them. Information packs for landlords may be more appropriate.

2.226 LB Haringey needs processes that minimise the risk of manipulation by landlords to obtain HB to which they are not entitled. We commend LB Haringey for its pro-active work on identifying landlords who are not fit and proper persons to receive HB and where landlords are paid direct in multiple HB claims.

We recommend that BIS staff should have a higher profile in the HA landlord forums. BIS should be more active in dealing with landlord and HA non residency issues, including the homeless unit. It should use its investigation powers (when obtained) to access available business information to establish accurate property and bedroom void dates.

 
Keeping it right – recommendations
We recommend that:
  • LB Haringey abandons the autoreview process and ensures documents are scanned on time. (Paragraph 2.151)
  • LB Haringey:

    • ensures that all staff adhere to the guidance that exists to ensure the veracity of evidence provided in support of claims
    • stops using autoreview forms, and uses the appropriate form for renewal claims
    • increases fraud awareness of staff and management, and ensures correct application to benefit processing, particularly in the area of occupational pensions. (Paragraph 2.169)
  • LB Haringey:

    • takes into account a claimant’s circumstances when setting benefit periods, including end date of WFTC, occupational pension uprating dates and shorthold tenure expiry
    • trains processing staff on the requirements of the regulations
    • monitors compliance as part of routine quality checks. (Paragraph 2.174)
  • LB Haringey pursues the non-return of renewal claim forms to find out why the claim has not been renewed, and to determine the correct date of termination of benefit entitlement. (Paragraph 2.175)
  • all processing staff are trained to recognise risk groups and to apply them correctly

  • compliance is monitored as part of routine quality checks. (Paragraph 2.178)
  • LB Haringey urgently allocates additional resources for appeal work. This will allow the existing backlog to be dealt with as soon as possible, and provide a more realistic staff complement to maintain this important element of benefit delivery, especially in the light of the new appeal procedures effective from July 2001. (Paragraph 2.191)
  • LB Haringey establishes a management reporting system to provide control and oversight of requests for reviews. This system should cover all activities associated with reviews, including the time taken to arrange and conduct review board hearings. This will provide management with greater assurance on the efficiency of review requests and help to identify weaknesses and delays as they arise. (Paragraph 2.191)
  • LB Haringey agrees and implements a rolling programme of fraud awareness training. Experienced investigators aware of local fraud trends should be involved in delivering these sessions. The programme should be co-ordinated as part of an overall training plan linked to the Benefits Service Business Plan. (Paragraph 2.205)
  • LB Haringey reviews its results from the Do Not Redirect scheme to analyse the causes of the disappointing results. (Paragraph 2.215)
  • LB Haringey establishes an accurate picture of the potential fraud risk by type. It can then develop an operational framework and a set of priorities to help target its counter fraud effort more effectively. (Paragraph 2.218)
  • BIS carries out a full evaluation of the Fraudwatch scheme, including:

    • publicity
    • the number and quality of referrals received
    • the standard of information passed to BIS by IA
    • the outcome of investigations. (Paragraph 2.220)
  • BIS staff should have a higher profile in the HA landlord forums. BIS should be more active in dealing with landlord and HA non residency issues, including the homeless unit. It should use its investigation powers (when obtained) to access available business information to establish accurate property and bedroom void dates. (Paragraph 2.226)

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